Author: Dr. Mohammad Jawad Salehi, PHD political science/ Political analyst and university professor

After collapse of Taliban in late 2001, the dominant understanding was that the group had been eliminated from Afghanistan political arena and that the group will be able to claim ground in a foreseeable future. Therefore the Bonn Conference laid down the structure of the new Afghan Administration without giving any role to Taliban. Now, after  years from the new administration, Taliban has reorganized itself as a serious challenge for Afghan government and the international community.

The government of Afghanistan, the international community and the political analysts has proposed various approaches including military, reconciliatory and a mixture of the two options to overcome the current challenging situation. The government particularly, is emphasizing on reconciliation and Hamid Karzai keeps calling Taliban members as “brothers” and so far has taken many steps towards bringing Taliban on the table including establishment of the High Peae Council to name one; even the government in order to gain trust of Taliban has been ignoring their terroristic activities and tries to make them somehow acceptable to public opinion.

The pro-reconciliation group holds that Taliban is no longer claiming their Islamic Emirate and now they have become more realistic. They argue that the only motive that drives Taliban to insurgency is the current presence of the foreign troops in the country. They say if the foreign forces withdraw from the country, the ground would be ready for Taliban to shift to political participation and lay down their guns.

At the same time, another group of political analysts and political activists hold that reconciliation with Taliban in the absence of a clear strategy- particularly when government enters talks with a weaker position and shows unnecessary flexibility, won’t any result and instead of bringing peace, will encourage Taliban to launch more terroristic operations. This group of analysts points out the below facts as impediments to the reconciliation process:

1- Ideological nature of Taliban

Taliban espouses a despotic ideology with its roots in “Pashtun Wali” and Deobandi” values; religious leaders of Taliban are mainly Mawlavis with Deobandi background. The group has close links with Pakistani religious groups such as” Sepah –e Sahaba”, Jamiatul Ulema”, and Sepah – e Mohammad. In the tribal and religious mindset of Taliban everything is either black or white; In Taliban eyes you are either with them or against them. There is no third option. Their values can’t be compromised. Taliban insist on withdrawal of the foreign forces, amending the Constitution, and removal of human rights and women rights articles from the Constitution. This is not easy to bring Taliban on the peace table while most of Afghanistan Constitutional values look meaningless to them.

2- Nostalgia of Power

The reality is this that dreams of regaining political power and longing for the past golden time when Taliban was ruling the country, is still something that motivates most of Taliban leaders. Weaknesses and failures of Afghanistan government as well as the whispers that foreign forces will withdraw have further strengthened such feelings amongst the Taliban leaders. As long as Taliban thinks and hopes that they can  one    day    regain   the

political regime, reconciliation efforts would result into nothing but wasting of time. In the worst situation, insurgency and conflict is a good trade for Taliban and their leaders get huge amounts of money through the conflicts.

3- Alliance with fundamental groups

Taliban since its very foundation has had close links with Pakistani religious groups. The group has also had close links and cooperation with Al- Qaedah.  These religious factions have been playing important role in strengthening Taliban regime as well as its current resurgence.  Taliban owes the group’s resurgence to financial supports attracted from Arab resources through Al- Qaedah, transferring Al- Qaedah insurgency skills and expertise from Iraq to Afghanistan, military training of Taliban members by Al- Qaedah as well as supports from Pakistani religious groups to Taliban to install the group’s training camps in Pakistani territory, recruit militants and easily cross Afghanistan borders. Therefore, this is not possible for Taliban to cut its links with these groups and factions. In case of cutting its links, the group in addition to losing financial and training supports would also lose its religious legitimacy.  There might be few individuals amongst Taliban leaders who are interested to cut the group’s links to Pakistani religious factions but their number isn’t enough to convince others. On the other hand, the Pakistani fundamental groups as well as Al- Qaedah have no interest to talk with Afghan government.  They are fighting to install their own type of government in the country.

4- Dependency on Pakistan

Taliban resurgence was not possible and sustainable without Pakistan support. In the wake of Taliban collapse, soon Pakistan became a safe-haven for the group’s trainings, recruitment, equipment and reorganization and Taliban supported by Pakistani religious groups and indirectly sponsored by ISI selected Pakistan’s North- West Frontier Province(NWFP) as its operational strongholds.  Victory of Islamic groups in NWFP, Pak- Indian tensions, and granting of local governments’ generous freedom to Islamic groups to operate inside Pakistan are other factors that have further contributed to Taliban resurgence. Pakistan has provided generous freedom to Taliban and has always resisted against requests of Afghan government to arrest Taliban leaders. Therefore, Pakistan has enough control and influence over Taliban and can always worsen relationships between Afghan government and Taliban. In the current situation Pakistan isn’t interested to push or pressure Taliban to enter talks with Afghan government. Thus, the Taliban dependency on Pakistan is another impediment ahead of peace process in Afghanistan.

Therefore, the peace process in Afghanistan is facing multiple challenges and it seems that the process has no clear prospect.